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Hogtied to Precedent: The Need for a Statutory Defintion of
“Agricultural Stormwater Discharge” in the Clean Water Act
Alt v. U.S. E.P.A., 2013 WL 5744778
Allison Tungate

I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of water pollution has been problematic since the time of
our ancestors, and the increase in human population has exacerbated the
problem by opening the door to more bacteria and disease.1 Water pollution
has plagued the United States since the 1800s. Despite gradual
improvements in sanitary living conditions,2 it was not until 1948 that
Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (“FWPCA”).3 Due
to various issues with the FWPCA,4 in 1972 Congress enacted the Clean
Water Act (“CWA”), which significantly broadened and restructured existing
water regulations.5 Congress passed the CWA with the objective of
restoring and maintaining the “chemical, physical and biological integrity of
the Nation’s waters.”6
Generally, the CWA has been lauded as a success because the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”)7 has
dramatically reduced the amount of pollution from point sources, and in turn,
has significantly improved the Nation’s water quality.8 Notwithstanding this
1

Nonpoint Source Pollution: A Brief History of Pollution, NOAA Ocean Serv. Educ.
(last modified March 25, 2008),
http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/education/kits/pollution/02history.html.
2
Id.
3
See infra note 41.
4
See infra note 41.
5
Summary of the Clean Water Act, EPA (last updated July 26, 2013),
http://www2.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-clean-water-act
6
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).
7
Overview of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, EPA (last modified
Mar. 12, 2009), http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/npdes/.
8
Id.
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accomplishment, many sources of water pollution remain outside the purview
of the CWA because very little attention has been given to nonpoint
sources—particularly “runoff from privately owned farmlands and its
cumulative effects on water quality and aquatic health.”9 While the CWA
vests the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) with the responsibility
of regulating “the discharge of any pollutant”10 via the issuance of “pollutionlimiting, technology-based permits,”11 the CWA unambiguously exempts all
“return flows from irrigated agriculture”12 and agricultural stormwater
discharges from the NPDES permit program.13 Instead, the burden is
delegated to the states to establish Best Management Practices (“BMPs”) in
order to control nonpoint sources, such as agriculture.14 However, the CWA
merely directs—not requires—states to establish BMPs.15 The EPA has
identified agriculture operations as being responsible for a majority of
nonpoint source pollution in the United States, so these exemptions and lack
of federal oversight are significant.16
The following comment explores Alt v. U.S. E.P.A.,17 in which the
United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia
addressed whether precipitation-caused runoff of litter and manure from a
farmyard was agricultural stormwater discharge and thus exempt from the
CWA’s permit requirement. The main issue was whether the litter
originating from a concentrated animal feeding operation (“CAFO”), which
is considered a point source, requires an NPDES permit, regardless of
whether the runoff was caused by precipitation. By correctly holding that
9

Lara D. Guercio, The Struggle Between Man and Nature-Agriculture, Nonpoint Source
Pollution, and Clean Water: How to Implement the State of Vermont's Phosphorous Tmdl
Within the Lake Champlain Basin, 12 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 455, 457 (2011).
10
33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2006).
11
Jan G. Laitos & Heidi Ruckriegle, The Clean Water Act and the Challenge of Agricultural
Pollution, 37 VT. L. REV. 1033 (2013).
12
33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(1) (2006).
13
See infra note 50.
14
Laitos & Ruckriegle, supra note 11, at 1034.
15
Id.; see 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1)(C)-(D).
16
Nonpoint Source Pollution: Agricultural Operations, NOAA Ocean Serv. Educ. (last
revised Mar. 25, 2008),
http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/education/kits/pollution/06operations.html.
17
979 F. Supp. 2d 701 (N.D. W. Va. 2013).
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based on the plain language of the CWA, the precipitation-caused run-off of
litter and manure from Petitioner’s CAFO was agricultural stormwater
discharge and thus exempt from the NPDES permit program, the court has
maintained consistency in how the term “agricultural stormwater discharge”
is applied to CAFOs. In doing so, the Court has thus taken an appropriate
step in providing clarity for an ambiguous area of the CWA.
II. FACTS & HOLDING
Plaintiff Lois Alt (“Plaintiff”) and Plaintiff Intervenors American
Farm Bureau and West Virginia Farm Bureau (“Plaintiff Intervenors”) sought
a declaratory judgment and other relief after the EPA found Plaintiff in
violation of the CWA and EPA’s implementing regulations.18 Subsequently,
the Potomac Riverkeeper, West Virginia Coalition, Waterkeeper Alliance,
Center for Food Safety, and Food & Water Watch (“Defendant Intervenors”)
intervened as defendants.
Plaintiff operated Eight is Enough Farm, a CAFO in Old Fields, West
Virginia.19 The CAFO consisted of eight poultry confinement houses, which
were equipped with ventilation fans, a litter storage shed, compost shed, and
feed storage bins. Plaintiff’s CAFO activity, which consisted of a poultry
growing operation and the storage of manure, litter, and raw materials,
occurred under one roof.20
Plaintiff implemented management practices and procedures to
minimize the amount of manure and litter exposed to precipitation in her
farmyard.21 Specifically, Plaintiff took the following precautionary
measures: raised poultry in confined poultry houses; stored manure, litter,
and composted mortalities in covered sheds; stored feed in covered bins; and
cleaned ventilation fans and shutters in such a way as to prevent the
collection of dust from being deposited in the farmyard.22 During transfer
operations, which involved loading trucks to haul away litter or moving litter
18

Id. at 703.
Id. at 704.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 704-705.
19
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out of the confinement houses to the storage shed, Plaintiff exercised
reasonable care in cleaning up any manure or litter that may have spilled
from the trucks.23 Plaintiff conducted litter transfers and loading operations
only during dry weather, and scraped and swept the loading areas at the
confinement houses and storage sheds both during and after the litter
transfers.24
Despite these precautionary measures taken by Plaintiff, some
particles of manure and litter from the confinement houses were tracked or
spilled onto Plaintiff’s farmland.25 Additionally, the ventilation fans from the
confinement houses blew dust composed of manure, litter and dander, as well
as feathers, onto the farmyard.26 When fallen precipitation made contact with
the particles, dust, and feathers from the confinement houses, runoff
containing the materials flowed across a neighboring green pasture and into
the Mudlick Run.27 Plaintiff did not have a permit pursuant to the CWA or
corresponding West Virginia state law authorizing discharges into the
Mudlick Run.28
Consequently, on November 14, 2011, the EPA asserted its regulatory
authority over stormwater runoff stemming from Plaintiff’s farmyard.29 The
EPA issued a “Findings of Violation and Order for Compliance,” finding
Plaintiff’s poultry production is a CAFO that “has discharged pollutants from
man-made ditches via sheet flow to Mudlick Run during rain events
generating runoff without having obtained a National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit.”30 The EPA concluded that Plaintiff
was in violation of the CWA and EPA’s implementing regulations.31 As a
result, EPA informed Plaintiff that the organization could bring both a civil

23

Id. at 705.
Id.
25
Id. at 704.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 705.
30
Id.
31
Id.
24
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and criminal action against her for her illegal discharges and ordered Plaintiff
to apply for a permit.32
In response, Plaintiff and Plaintiff Intervenors moved for summary
judgment, arguing any precipitation related discharges containing manure
and litter emanating from Plaintiff’s farmyard are exempt from the CWA
since they qualified as agricultural stormwater discharge.33 The EPA argued
the Court lacked jurisdiction since the issue had been addressed by the EPA
in its 2003 CAFO Rule, which was affirmed in Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v.
USEPA.34 The EPA also argued the agricultural stormwater exemption
applies only to discharges from land application areas under the control of the
CAFO.35
The District Court held that because Plaintiff and Plaintiff Intervenors
did not challenge the 2003 CAFO Rules pertaining to discharges from land
application areas, the action was not barred by Waterkeeper36 or 33 U.S.C.
section 1369(b).37 The Court applied the “arbitrary and capricious” standard
promulgated by the Administrative Procedure Act, and held the runoff from
Plaintiff’s CAFO operation was exempt from regulation by the EPA because
it was agricultural stormwater discharge.38 Accordingly, when there is
precipitation-caused runoff of litter and manure from a farmyard, such runoff
is considered agricultural stormwater discharge and is thus exempted from
the CWA’s permit requirement.39

32

Id.
Id.
34
Id.; see infra note 36.
35
Id.
36
Id.; see also, Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 399 F.3d 486 (2nd Cir. 2005).
37
Plaintiff and Plaintiff Interveners did not challenge the validity of the regulations as
written, so § 1369(b) was not a jurisdictional bar to the suit; see also, Alt v. U.S. E.P.A.,
979 F. Supp. 2d at 705.
38
Alt, 970 F. Supp. 2d. at 706, 715; see 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966).
39
Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 715.
33
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. History of CWA
In 1948, Congress enacted the FWPCA, the primary predecessor of
the CWA, in an effort to combat water pollution caused by increased postWorld War II industrial activity and “lower expenditures on wastewater
treatment.”40 Recognizing water pollution control was primarily the
responsibility of state and local governments, Congress assigned the states
the task of developing water quality standards and implementation plans.41
Additionally, the FWPCA encouraged states to enact uniform laws and
interstate compacts.42 The federal government was given the secondary role
of bolstering local pollution control programs by funding research on water
pollution and providing loans and federal grants to help the financing of
treatment facilities and water pollution control programs.43
Although a federal statute, the FWPCA gave the federal government
limited jurisdiction and any enforcement that was created was “awkward and
time consuming.”44 The FWPCA was fraught with enforcement issues, and
so in 1972, Congress amended the Act to relieve the states of the requirement
of instituting their own individual water pollution discharge regulations.45
Instead, Congress established the federally mandated National Pollutant
40

William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United States-State,
Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part II, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 215, 235 (2003).
41
Kenneth M. Murchison, Learning from More Than Five-and-A-Half Decades of Federal
Water Pollution Control Legislation: Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 527, 531-32 (2005).
42
Id. at 530-31.
43
Id. at 530.
44
“Federal enforcement power was . . . limited . . . to cases where interstate pollution
actually endangered the health or welfare of persons in a neighboring state. Polluters were
immune to federal action as long as they only endangered local residents or refrained from
activities that actually threatened public health . . . . The government could only seek an
injunction after completing a lengthy, three-step process.” Andreen, supra note 40, at 238;
see Murchison, supra note 41, at 531 (“. . . [T]he federal government could proceed only
with the approval of state officials in the state where the discharge originated and after a
complicated series of notices, warnings, hearings, and conference recommendations.”).
45
Nat'l Pork Producers Council v. U.S. E.P.A., 635 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir. 2011).
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Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”)46 permit program, which
effectively transformed the FWCPA into what is today known as the “Clean
Water Act.”47 As the heart and soul of the CWA, the NDPES permit
program does not focus on the effect of the discharge but instead concentrates
on non-compliance with the specific limits in the permits.48 In doing so, the
permit program aims to improve the identification and enforcement of
pollution requirements.49
Substantively, the NDPES permit program authorizes the discharge of
pollutants,50 which would otherwise be illegal under section 301(a)51 of the
CWA.52 Applying exclusively to the “discharge of pollutants,”53 the NPDES
permit program requires any facility that adds new pollutants from its
industrial process through a point source into a stream or lake to have a
permit,54 which is issued by the EPA or one of the forty-six states authorized
to do so.55 A point source is defined as “any discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel,
46

33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2014).
Nat'l Pork Producers Council, 635 F.3d at 742-43; “Clean Water Act” was not formally
acknowledged until the amendments of 1977. Murchison, supra note 41, at 536.
48
See CWA § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (establishing administrative, civil and criminal
penalties for violations of substantive restrictions and limitations provided in an NPDES
permit).
49
Jeffrey M. Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES General Permits Under the Clean Water Act,
31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409, 413 (2007).
50
“The term ‘discharge of a pollutant’ and the term ‘discharge of pollutants’ each means . . .
any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source, . . . any addition of
any pollutant to the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any point source other
than a vessel or floating craft.” CWA § 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2014).
51
The discharge of a pollutant is unlawful unless in compliance with various sections of the
Act. See CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(1).
52
Gaba, supra note 49, at 413.
53
CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
54
Gaba, supra note 49, at 415.
55
These 46 states are authorized to administer permits for the discharge of pollutants into
navigable waters instead of the NPDES program. If authorized to oversee its own program,
a state will become its own NPDES permit-issuing agency, as opposed to the
EPA. However, the EPA still retains authority to oversee the issuance of such permits. The
EPA also preserves the right to veto any issuance of a permit as well as enforce any violation
of the CWA or of a state-issued discharge permit. Nat’l Pork Producers Council, 635 F.3d at
743; see also, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c), (d), and (i) (2014).
47
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tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated
animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft from which
pollutants are or may be discharged.”56 Facilities with a permit may only
discharge pollutants pursuant to several substantive restrictions.57
B. Agricultural Stormwater Discharge Exemption
In response to the NPDES permit program, the EPA promulgated
regulations exempting certain classes of point sources from the permit
requirements.58 These exemptions included all CAFOs below a certain size;
all non-feedlot, non-irrigation agricultural point sources; and separate storm
sewers containing only storm runoff uncontaminated by an industrial or
commercial activity.59 The EPA rationalized, “In order to conserve the
[EPA’s] enforcement resources for more significant point sources of
pollution, it [was] necessary to exclude these smaller sources of pollutant
discharges from the permit program.”60 In Natural Resources Def. Council v.
Train,61 the District of Columbia Circuit Court was faced with the issue of
whether these promulgated exemptions were within the purview of the EPA
Administrator. Based on the definition of “point source” at the time,62 the
court held that “the EPA Administrator lacked the authority to exempt point

56

CWA § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2014); see supra note 23.
Effluent limitations outlined in the NPDES permit stipulate the amount of specific
pollutants that may be discharged from a point source. All point sources must meet
technology-based limitations, which are determined by what is considered
technologically and economically achievable based on existing technology. Point
sources are also subject to water quality based effluent limitations, which are
implemented to ensure attainment of state water quality standards. Gaba, supra note 49,
at 416.
58
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
59
Id.; see, 40 C.F.R. § 125.4 (1975) (listing of all the exempted point sources).
60
Costle, 568 F.2d at 1372-73.
61
396 F. Supp. 1393 (D.D.C. 1975).
62
Originally, the term “point source” was defined as “any discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well,
discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or
other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged.” Costle, 568 F.2d at
1372; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2014).
57
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source discharging pollutants from regulation,” thus voiding the
regulations.63
In response to Natural Resources Def. Council v. Train, in 1987
Congress amended section 1362(14) by adding an exemption to the statutory
definition of a point source.64 Supplementing the original definition of “point
source,” the new definition clarified that the “term does not include
agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated
agriculture.”65 Despite the addition of the exemption, Congress did not
explicitly define “agricultural stormwater discharge.”66
In subsequent years the term was interpreted according to its plain
meaning. For instance, in Concerned Area Residents for the Environment v.
Southview Farm,67 the Second Circuit determined the “agricultural
stormwater discharge” exemption applied to any discharges that were the
result of precipitation, and nothing in the language of the statute indicated the
exemption only applied to stormwater that was discharged where it would
naturally flow.68 Similarly, in Fishermen Against the Destruction of the
Environment v. Closter Farms, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit determined
regardless of whether stormwater was being pumped into a lake or flowing
naturally, the exemption still applied.69
C. CAFOs’ Regulatory Background
At roughly the same time the EPA was establishing the NPDES
permit program generally and its exemptions, the agency adopted the first set
63

Alt, supra note 17, at 707.
Id.
65
Id.; “The term ‘point source’ means any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,
including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well discrete fissure,
container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating
craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does not include
agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture.” Id.; see
also 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2014).
66
Alt, supra note 17, at 707.
67
34 F.3d 114, 115 (2d Cir. 1994).
68
Id. at 120-21.
69
300 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2002).
64
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of NPDES regulations addressing CAFOs in 1976.70 Animal feeding
operations are facilities that house, raise, and feed animals until they are
ready for transport to processing facilities that prepare meat for shipment and
consumption.71 Because CAFOs house such a large population of animals,
this collectively leads to the production of millions of tons of animal manure
every year,72 which in turn pose major risks to the environment and public
health.73 Animal waste pollutes navigable waters by adding “excess
nutrients, organic matter, and pathogens,”74 which poses serious health risks
to humans.75
Because of the substantial risk of water pollution, the EPA’s 1976
regulations required that CAFOs wanting to permissibly emit discharges
would have to obtain a permit largely based on the number of animals housed
at the facility.76 Failure to obtain a permit for a CAFO would result in civil
or criminal liability.77
70

Nat'l Pork Producers Council v. U.S. E.P.A., 635 F.3d 738, 742-43 (5th Cir. 2011).
Sara R. Reichenauer, Note, Issuing Violations Without Tangible Evidence: Computer
Modeling for Clean Water Act Enforcement, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 1011, 1019 (2010).
72
Id. at 1019-20.
73
Id. at 1020; see EPA Preamble to the Final Rule, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System Permit Regulation and Effluent Limitation Guidelines and Standards for
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 68 Fed. Reg. 7176, 7179 (estimating that AFO
facilities create approximately five hundred million tons of manure annually, which the EPA
estimates to be more than three times more than humans generate in the United States).
74
U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Animal Agriculture: Information on Waste Management
and Water Quality Issues 1 (1995), http:// www.gao.gov/archive/1995/rc95200b.pdf; see
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and Effluent
Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 66
Fed. Reg. 2960, 2976-79 (proposed Jan. 12, 2001) (detailing the pollutants associated
with CAFO waste).
75
Charles Duhigg, Health Ills Abound as Farm Runoff Fouls Wells, N.Y. Times, Sept.
17, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/18/us/18dairy.html?scp=1&sq=clean%20water%C20ac
t% 20agriculture&st=cse (noting that animal waste pollution can cause human ailments
such as diarrhea).
76
Nat’l Pork Producers Council, 635 F.3d at 743-44 (specifying that “large” CAFOs—those
with 1,000 animals or more—were required to have an NPDES permit to discharge
pollutants; “medium” CAFOs—those with 300 to 1,000 animals—were required to have a
permit if they emitted a certain types of discharges; and most “small” CAFOs—300 animals
71

465

HOGTIED TO PRECEDENT
1. The 2003 Rule & Waterkeeper
After the promulgation of the 1976 regulations, which clarified the
type of operations that would be considered CAFOs, the NPDES
requirements, and the effluent limitation guidelines, the EPA was sued in
1989 for “failing to publish a plan to revise existing effluent limitations for
the industry pursuant [to the CWA].”78 The court in Natural Resource
Defense Council v. Reilly79 mandated that the EPA update and enforce its
CAFO regulations in order to comply with section 1314(m) of the CWA.80
As a result of the litigation, on January 21, 2001, the EPA “proposed to
‘revise and update’ the first set of CAFO regulations.”81 The proposed
revisions sought to remedy inadequate compliance with already-existing
policy and adapt the new rules to reflect changes in the animal production
industries.82 Specifically, the EPA aimed to modify the regulations to reflect
the “trend toward fewer but larger operations,” which consequently resulted
in “large-scale discharges from the facilities” and “continued run-off.”83

or less—typically were not required to have a permit, but possibly would have to if the small
CAFO emitted certain discharges after an onsite inspection and notice); see also 41 Fed.
Reg. 11458 (Mar. 18, 1976).
77
Nat’l Pork Producers Council, 635 F.3d at 744.
78
Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 399 F.3d 486, 495 (2d Cir. 2005); see 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(m) (1987) (establishing that the EPA Administrator must publish in the Federal
Register a plan outlining the schedule for the annual review and revision of promulgated
effluent guidelines); see also Consent Decree, as amended, NRDC v. Reilly, modified sub
nom., NRDC v. Whitman, No. 89-2980 (D.D.C. 1/31/1992) (resolving the suit by “a consent
decree in which the EPA agreed to propose new effluent limitation guidelines for the swine,
poultry, beef and dairy subcategories of CAFOs.”).
79
983 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
80
Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., 399 F.3d at 494; see 66 Fed. Reg. 2960, 2976-79 (proposed
Jan. 12, 2001); see also Preamble to the Final Rule at 68 Fed. Reg. 7181.
81
Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., 399 F.3d at 494.
82
Id.
83
Id. (citing National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Regulation and
Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations,
66 Fed. Reg. 2960, 2972 (proposed Jan. 12, 2001)).
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After the Notice and Comment period,84 the EPA promulgated its
Final CAFO Rule (“2003 Rule”) on February 12, 2003.85 The 2003 Rule
reflected the revised permitting requirements and effluent limitations of
CAFOs by broadening the number of animal feeding operations subject to the
NPDES permit program as CAFOs.86 The 2003 Rule required all CAFOs to
apply for an NPDES requirement, regardless of whether or not they
discharged.87 However, the 2003 Rule allowed for CAFOs to request from
the EPA a “no potential discharge” determination if they could prove so,
thereby exempting them from the NPDES permit program.88 The 2003 Rule
also required CAFOs applying for a NPDES permit to develop and
implement a site-specific Management Plan (“NMP”), which required a
determination of “best management practices” (“BMPs”) in order “to ensure
adequate storage of manure and wastewater, proper management of
mortalities and chemicals, and appropriate site-specific protocols for land
application.”89
Additionally, the 2003 Rule added requirements applicable to land
application of manure.90 In section 122.23(e), the 2003 Rule provided that:
The discharge of manure, litter or process wastewater
to [navigable waters] from a CAFO as a result of the
application of manure, litter or process wastewater by the
CAFO to land areas under its control is a discharge…and
subject to NPDES
permit requirements, except where it is
an agricultural stormwater discharge as provided in 33 U.S.C.
Section 1362(14).91
84

“The EPA received approximately 11,000 public comments on the proposed rule…as well
as an additional 450 or so comments following the publication, in November 2001 and July
2002, of Notices of Data Availability.” Id. at 495.
85
Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., 399 F.3d at 495; see 40 C.F.R. §§ 9, 122, 123, 412.
86
Laitos & Ruckriegle, supra note 11, at 1059.
87
Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 708.
88
Id.
89
Nat’l Pork Producers Council, 635 F.3d at 744 (citing 68 Fed. Reg. 7176, 7176 (Feb.
12, 2003).
90
Id.
91
40 C.F.R. § 122.23(e) (2003).
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However, if CAFOs land-applied waste was done “in accordance with
site-specific nutrient management practices that ensure appropriate
agricultural utilization of the nutrients in that waste,”92 a precipitation-related
discharge of manure, litter, or process wastewater from land areas under the
control of a CAFO was an agricultural stormwater discharge.93 Thus, the
2003 Rule “expanded the definition of exempt ‘agricultural stormwater
discharge.’”94
Consequently, various aspects of the 2003 Rule were challenged in
court.95 In Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A.,96 petitioners97 requested
the Second Circuit “vacate the 2003 Rule’s ‘duty to apply’,” contending it
was outside the scope of the EPA’s authority.98 Agreeing with the
petitioners, the Second Circuit held that the EPA impermissibly required
CAFOs to apply for a permit based merely on the potential of discharging
pollutants99 and ordered the EPA to remove the requirement that all CAFOs
apply for NPDES permits.100 The Second Circuit rationalized that the plain
language of the CWA did not give the EPA authority to impose obligations
on CAFOs to show “no potential to discharge.”101
The Second Circuit rejected the petitioners’ contention that the 2003
Rule’s exclusion of agricultural stormwater discharge resulting from land
application violated the CWA’s definition of “point source.”102 Petitioners
argued that according to the language of the CWA, all discharges originating
from a CAFO, which is a point source under the Act, require a NPDES
permit “notwithstanding the fact that agricultural stormwater discharges are
92

Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., 399 F.3d at 495-96.
40 C.F.R. § 122.23(e) (2003); see, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2014).
94
Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 708.
95
Laitos & Ruckriegle, supra note 11, at 1059.
96
399 F.3d 486 (2nd Cir. 2005).
97
There were both “environmental” and “farm” parties who either petitioned or
intervened in Waterkeeper. For a complete list of the petitioners, see Nat’l Pork
Producers Council, 635 F.3d at 744.
98
Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 708.
99
Id. (citing Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., 399 F.3d at 505).
100
Laitos & Ruckriegle, supra note 11, at 1059.
101
Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., 399 F.3d at 506.
102
Id. at 507; Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 704.
93
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otherwise deemed exempt form regulation.”103 The Second Circuit
disagreed, stating despite the ambiguity in the CWA as to whether CAFO
discharges could ever constitute agricultural stormwater, the congressional
intent and precedent buttressed the EPA’s argument that excluding
agricultural stormwater discharge resulting from land application as a point
source was a permissible construction of the CWA.104
2. The 2008 Rule & Guidance Letters
On June 30, 2006, in response to the Second Circuit’s decision in
Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc.,105 the EPA proposed a new rule requiring a
CAFO owner or operator to apply for a permit only if the CAFO actually
discharged or proposed to discharge pollutants.106 On November 20, 2008,
the Final 2008 Rule (“2008 Rule”) was published.107 The 2008 Rule clarified
the term “duty to apply,” determining that each CAFO operator had to make
a case-by-case decision as to whether there would be discharges due to their
operations.108
As is customary after promulgating a new and complex regulation,
the EPA issued three guidance letters.109 Benjamin H. Grumbles, Assistant
Administrator for the EPA’s Office of Water, sent a guidance letter to
Senator Thomas R. Carper of Delaware and another to then-congressperson
Michael N. Castle of Delaware.110 James D. Giattina, Director of the Water
Protection Division for Region 4, sent a letter to Jeff Smith, an executive for
Perdue Farms, Inc.111 The guidance letters sent to the Delaware Congress
members explained the CWA prohibited the discharge of pollutants from a
CAFO without a permit.112 The guidance letters further stated, “[t]he term
103
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pollutant is defined very broadly in the CWA…Potential sources of such
pollutants at a CAFO could include…litter released through confinement
house ventilation fans…Any point source discharge of stormwater that comes
into contact with these materials and reaches waters of the United States is a
violation of the CWA unless authorized by a permit.”113
The letter sent to Smith by Giattina was in response to Smith’s
question regarding “whether operators of dry litter farms need to apply for a
permit ‘because of potential runoff from the production area, [and if] so, are
there examples of dry poultry litter operations having a discharge?’”114 The
guidance letter explained that because the term “pollutant” is defined
broadly, theoretically CWA regulations could apply to litter released through
house ventilations fans. The guidance letter addressed the agricultural
stormwater exemption, stating it “applies only to precipitation-related
discharges from land application areas…where application of manure, litter,
or process wastewater is in accordance with appropriate nutrient management
practices…and not to discharges from the CAFO production area.”115
As a result of these guidance letters, the Fifth Circuit was asked to
decide if these guidance letters constituted final agency action in National
Pork Producers Council v. U.S. E.P.A.116 Applying the Bennett two-prong
test,117 the Court held that the guidance letters did not constitute final agency
action because the letters were merely restating the prohibition against
discharging pollutants without an NPDES permit, thus giving advice or
“guidance” to a question posed to the EPA.118 First, the court reasoned that
although “guidance letters can mark the ‘consummation’ of an agency’s
decision-making process…[t]here must also be evidence that the guidance
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letters have made a substantive change in the regulation of CAFOs.”119
Further, the court stated the second prong of the Bennett test states that in
order to constitute final agency action, guidance letters must also affect rights
or obligations or create new legal consequences.120 Applying this second
prong, the court reasoned despite the fact the letters put an obligation on
petitioners to obtain a permit if they discharged manure or litter through
ventilation fans, the letters neither created any new legal consequences nor
affected their rights.121
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The Alt court first began its analysis by determining the appropriate
standard of review to be whether the EPA’s decision was “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the
law,” as set forth by the Administrative Procedure Act.122 Because the
standard is narrow, the court deferred only to the administrative record that
was complied by the EPA.123 After establishing the appropriate legal
standard, the court began by resoundingly rejecting what appeared to be the
central assumption of EPA’s position: the agricultural stormwater discharge
exemption had no meaning at all from the time it was added to the CWA in
1987 until the promulgation of new regulations in 2003.124 The court stated,
“It is a basic tenet that ‘regulations,’ in order to be valid, must be consistent
with the statute under which they are promulgated.”125 The court showed the
inconsistency of the EPA’s assumption with the CWA by engaging in
statutory deconstruction of the term “agricultural stormwater discharge.”
First, the court noted the CWA never defined the term “agricultural
stormwater discharge.”126 Accordingly, the Court stated the term should be
given its ordinary meaning as Congress found it unnecessary to define it.127
119
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Next, the court looked at the term “discharge of a pollutant,” which is defined
by the CWA as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any
point source.”128 Thus, the court acknowledged that the general prohibition
in section 1311(a)129 and the requirement to obtain an NPDES permit in
accordance with section 1342130 only applies to discharges from a point
source.131
Because the NPDES permit requirement hinges on whether a
discharge comes from a point source, the court next looked to the meaning of
“point source,” defined by the CWA as:
[A]ny discernible, confined and discrete conveyance,
including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel,
conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock,
concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other
floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be
discharged. This term does not include agricultural
stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated
agriculture.132
The court recognized CAFOs are generally considered a point source,
but the CWA specifically excludes “agricultural stormwater discharges,”
regardless of whether they are associated with a CAFO or any other type of
point source.133 Therefore, the court concluded the discharge of pollutants
from a CAFO required an NPDES permit unless the discharge is considered
an “agricultural stormwater discharge.”134
Consequently, the court determined that because neither the CWA nor
the EPA’s implementing regulations defined “agricultural stormwater
discharges” in relation to CAFO farmyard runoff, the onus of interpreting the
128
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statutory term fell to the court.135 Relying on precedent, the court determined
the terms “agricultural” and “stormwater” should be given their ordinary
meanings in accordance with their common usage.136 Additionally, the court
looked to the Fourth Circuit, which established the two principles of statutory
construction are “plain English and common sense.”137 Applying these two
principles, the court was led to the “inescapable conclusion that Ms. Alt’s
poultry operation is ‘agricultural’ in nature and that the precipitation-caused
runoff from her farmyard is ‘stormwater.’”138
In support of defining the terms by their ordinary meaning, the court
relied on similar decisions made by other jurisdictions. First the court cited
Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. EPA,139 a Second Circuit case which took the
same approach when reviewing the EPA’s general interpretation of the
agricultural stormwater exception in the context of CAFO land application
areas.140 In Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., the Second Circuit held that
“dictionaries from the period in which the agricultural stormwater exception
was adopted defined ‘agriculture’ or ‘agricultural’ in a way that can
permissibly be construed to encompass CAFOs.”141
Regarding
“stormwater,” the Second Circuit agreed with the EPA that the term should
be defined as “precipitation-related discharge[s].”142 As a result of this
similar analysis conducted by the Second Circuit, the court established that
contrary to the EPA’s position, the agricultural stormwater discharge
exemption clearly existed prior to the promulgation of the 2003
regulations.143
Furthermore, the court in the instant case looked to another Second
Circuit case, Concerned Area Residents for the Env’t v. Southview Farm,144
which entailed a citizen suit against a large dairy farm that spread manure
135
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over its fields, allowing the manure to run off into surface water during
periods of both precipitation and non-precipitation.145 To decide whether this
runoff met the statutory exemption for agricultural stormwater, the Second
Circuit looked to the legislative history and context of the CWA.146 In 1987,
Congress simultaneously created the CWA’s new stormwater permitting
program and the agricultural stormwater exemption. As a result of this
legislative history, the Second Circuit deduced that permits would not be
required for agricultural stormwater under the new stormwater permit
program.147 The court then interpreted the statutory phrase “agricultural
stormwater” by giving the words their common-sense meaning, resulting in
the conclusion that “a discharge of liquid manure would not be exempt just
because it happened to be raining at the time, but [rather] a discharge of such
manure caused by precipitation would be exempt.”148
Similarly, the court looked to Fishermen Against the Destruction of
the Environment v. Closter Farmers, Inc.,149 an Eleventh Circuit case that
determined that water pumped into Lake Okeechobee by Closter Farms was
“agricultural stormwater.” Citing the CWA’s specific exemption of
“agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigation
agriculture,”150 the Eleventh Circuit concluded that “[b]ecause these water
discharges are not considered to be point sources, there is no requirement that
a property owner discharging these waters have an NPDES permit.”151
Additionally, the court looked to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in National Pork
Producers Council v. U.S. EPA,152 which determined “[t]he 2003 Rule also
expanded the definition of exempt ‘agricultural stormwater discharge’ to
include land application discharge, if the land application comported with
145
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appropriate site-specific nutrient management practices.”153 Using these
similar rulings, the court in the instant case further justified its conclusion
that the agricultural stormwater exemption existed prior to the 2003
regulations, despite the EPA’s presumed position.154
Next, the court considered whether the EPA was entitled to any type
of deference.155 Because Congress never defined the term “agricultural
stormwater discharge” and the EPA never promulgated any regulations
defining the term other than in reference to land applications, which
expanded the preexisting exemption,156 the court determined that deference
was inappropriate under Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC and Auer v. Robbins.157
The court also determined that limited deference would be given to the
guidance letters only to the extent that they had the power to persuade.158
The court declared that any possible deference was tempered by the fact that
the EPA’s position regarding the exclusivity of the land application area
regulations changed from its prior position in 2003.159 Thus, the court
concluded “there is more to the agricultural stormwater exemption than as set
forth in the 2003 land application area regulations.”160
After determining the land application area regulations were not the
exclusive source of the agricultural stormwater exemption and limited
deference would be given to the EPA, the court then addressed EPA’s
153
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argument that stormwater from a CAFO’s production area is not entitled to
the exemption and Plaintiff’s discharge was industrial in nature rather than
agricultural.161 First, the court agreed with the Respondent and rejected
Plaintiff’s argument that the farmyard area of the Alt farm was not part of the
CAFO, noting that the grassy areas between the poultry houses were part of
the production facility.162 The CWA defined “facility” to include any “point
source…including land or appurtenances thereto.”163 The court reasoned that
Plaintiff’s interpretation of the term “facility” to exclude this area
contravened the plain language of the regulatory definition.164 As a result,
the court established that the term “facility” applied to any CAFO and the
land appurtenant thereto—including the farmyard.165 The court noted
however that the inquiry could not stop there since the EPA itself had stated
that “[n]othing in the statutory language or legislative history indicates that
Congress did not mean to include agricultural stormwater discharges from a
CAFO in this exclusion.”166
As a result, the court next turned to Defendant’s argument that “the
production area of a CAFO is ineligible for the agricultural stormwater
discharge exemption.”167 However, the court did not even consider whether
this assertion was pertinent because the area at issue was the Alt’s
“farmyard,” not a “production area.”168 Citing the regulatory definition of
“production area,”169 the court reasoned that the areas between Plaintiff’s
poultry houses clearly did not qualify as “the animal confinement area, the
manure storage area, the raw materials storage area, [or] the waste
161
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containment areas.”170 The court reasoned a “farmyard” does not include
areas where animals are confined.171 Thus, the Alt “farmyard” was not a
“production area.”172
To justify this assessment, the court cited the EPA’s 2003 Response
to Comments, in which the EPA noted the definition of “production area”
does not explicitly include the entire farmyard.173 Thus, the court argued it
was clear the EPA had long interpreted the agricultural stormwater
exemption as being inapplicable to runoff occurring within a confinement
area, manure storage area, and other features deemed as the CAFO
“production area.”174 The Court pointed out that because of this long held
interpretation, many farmers like Plaintiff kept their animals under the same
roof and maintained covered structures for activities such as manure storage
and composting in order to be considered a “farmyard” and not a “production
area.”175
Further, the EPA argued that although the manure and litter were in
the farmyard, they originated from the production area, which would thus
render such discharge ineligible for the stormwater exemption.176 Relying on
Waterkeeper once again, the court rejected this argument. In Waterkeeper,
the Second Circuit established that the CWA should be read “as generally
authorizing the regulation of CAFO discharges, but exempting such
discharges from regulation to the extent that they constitute agricultural
stormwater.”177 The Second Circuit further explained that such discharges
are exempt from regulation under the CWA “even when those discharges
came from what would otherwise be point sources.”178 Based upon this
rationale, the court reasoned manure and litter in the farmyard would remain
170
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in place only until stormwater carried the particles to navigable waters, which
would then result in the discharge of a pollutant.179
After establishing that Plaintiff’s farmyard did not meet the regulatory
definition of “production area,” the court considered Defendant’s argument
that in order to employ the agricultural stormwater discharge exemption, the
discharge must have an agricultural purpose.180 The court established the
only requirement is the discharges be agriculture related. 181 Consequently,
the determined that because the incidental manure and litter from Plaintiff’s
farmyard was related to the raising of poultry, such discharges were related to
agriculture.182 Again, the court referred back to Waterkeeper, in which the
Second Circuit recognized that by promulgating the agricultural stormwater
exemption, “Congress was affirming the impropriety of imposing...liability
for agriculture-related discharges triggered not by negligence or malfeasance,
but by the weather—even when those discharges came from what would
otherwise be point sources.”183
Finally, the court rejected Defendant’s contention that discharges
stemming from Plaintiff’s farmyard are industrial as opposed to agricultural,
giving three justifications.184 First, the court looked to the Compliance Order
issued by Defendant to Plaintiff and noted the EPA never once mentioned
“industrial stormwater.” Next, the Court relied on Waterkeeper, in which the
Second Circuit rejected the proposition that CAFOS should be viewed as
industrial, not agricultural.185 Finally, the Court reiterated that the sole issue
is whether the stormwater discharges from Plaintiff’s farmyard are exempt as
“agricultural stormwater discharges,” and if so, exempt from any NPDES
permit requirements, including industrial stormwater permit requirements.186
Citing Southview Farm, the court noted that Congress created the stormwater
permitting program at the same time as the promulgation of the agricultural
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stormwater exemption, which suggests the intent to explicitly exclude
agricultural operations form regulation under the stormwater program.187
V. COMMENT
Although the CWA has been lauded as significantly improving the
nation’s water quality, a wide range of sources continue to pollute and
contaminate water bodies in the United States.188 Particularly, the EPA has
identified CAFOs as being a significant contributor to the remaining water
quality problems.189 Because CAFOs are largely responsible for the
remaining water pollution in the United States, there is disagreement between
environmental groups and the agricultural industry as to whether the
“agricultural stormwater discharge” exemption should apply to CAFOs.190
Environmental groups argue that because CAFOs are such significant
contributors to ongoing water pollution, the agricultural stormwater discharge
exemption should not apply to such operations for the sake of furthering the
CWA’s goal of restoring and maintaining the “chemical, physical and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”191
Courts like the District Court in Alt have been faced with the task of
determining the meaning and breadth of the statutory term “agricultural
stormwater discharge.” In Alt, the court explicitly stated that because neither
the CWA nor EPA’s implementing regulations had defined “agricultural
stormwater discharge,” past precedent192 required the court to interpret the
statutory term in accordance with its ordinary meaning and common usage.193
Based on “plain English and common sense,” the court came to the
“inescapable conclusion that [Petitioner Alt’s] operation was ‘agricultural’ in
187
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nature and that the precipitation-caused runoff from her farmyard was
“stormwater.”194
In support of its conclusion, the court cited the Second Circuit as
taking the same approach when reviewing whether the EPA’s interpretation
of the “agricultural stormwater discharge” exemption applied to CAFO land
application areas.195 In Waterkeeper, the Second Circuit explained that
“[d]ictionaries from the period in which the agricultural stormwater
exemption was adopted define[d] ‘agriculture’ or ‘agricultural’ in a way that
[could] be permissibly construed to encompass CAFOS.”196 Additionally,
the Second Circuit agreed with the EPA’s contention that “stormwater”
meant “precipitation-related discharges.”197 Furthermore, the Alt Court’s
conclusion that Petitioner’s CAFO is covered by the agricultural stormwater
discharge exemption is supported by another Second Circuit decision, in
which the court explained that “[b]ecause Congress had created the
stormwater permitting program at the same time (1987) that it enacted the
agricultural stormwater exception” it should be inferred that “Congress
intended that no permits would be required for agricultural stormwater under
the new stormwater permit program.”198
In view of the precedent defining “agricultural stormwater discharge”
by its plain and ordinary meaning and applying that term to CAFOs, the Alt
court has taken the logical step by further clarifying the breadth of the
statutory term. Because CAFOs play such a prominent role in contributing to
existing water pollution and given the lack of existing regulations affecting
agricultural operations, it is imperative to establish a uniform and consistent
definition of “agricultural stormwater discharge” in order to discern what
type of activity requires a permit and what type of activity is exempt.
Specifically, consistent application of the term “agricultural stormwater
discharge” will allow CAFOs the opportunity to formulate appropriate best
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management plans and nutrient management plans to significantly reduce, if
not eliminate, precipitation-caused discharges.
Although the Alt decision is supported by similar decisions and
rationale in other jurisdictions, it is worth noting that these courts had their
hands tied due to the lack of guidance from either the CWA or the EPA’s
implementing regulations. As noted in Alt, the only guidance the EPA has
given with regard to how “agricultural stormwater discharge” should be
defined is with respect to land application.199 In fact, in the preamble to the
2003 Rule, the EPA stated it “does not intend its discussion of how the scope
of point sources discharges from a CAFO is limited by the agricultural
stormwater exemption to apply to discharges that do not occur as a result of
land application of manure, litter, or process wastewater by a CAFO to land
areas under its control….”200 Therefore, despite the meritorious argument
that CAFOs should be exempted from the agricultural stormwater discharge
exemption because of their significant contribution to water pollution, the Alt
court was left with no choice but to interpret the law in a way consistent with
the implementing statute.201 Because Congress found it unnecessary to
define the term, the court was forced to interpret the term in accordance with
its ordinary meaning.
Because the breadth of the “agricultural stormwater discharge”
exemption is such a contentious issue between environmental groups and the
agricultural industry, Alt illuminates the growing need for the EPA to issue
an implementing regulation that further clarifies, if not unambiguously
defines, the scope of the exemption. Although the 2003 Rule explains the
“EPA’s longstanding interpretation that the agricultural stormwater discharge
exemption is inapplicable to runoff from within a confinement area, manure
storage area, and similar features deemed to be the CAFO “production
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area,”202 further guidance is needed regarding runoff occurring outside these
specified areas—like the farmyard in Plaintiff’s case.
Specifically, the EPA needs to issue a regulation that provides
definitive guidance as to the scope of the agricultural stormwater discharge
exemption, while also mandating BMPs and NMPs for all CAFO operators to
“implement management practices and procedures to reduce the amount of
manure and litter that will be exposed to precipitation in farmyards.”203 By
mandating BMPs, the amount of manure and litter in exempted areas of the
CAFO would be significantly, if not completely, reduced. In doing so,
CAFO operators would be held accountable for ensuring their respective
BMPs are not significantly contributing to water quality problems, while
being allowed to avoid the NPDES permit program. Additionally, such a
regulation would refrain from imposing liability on CAFO operators for
uncontrollable events—like the weather—while furthering the over-arching
goal of the CWA.
Such definitive guidance would likely result in a greater number of
CAFOs being required to apply for an NPDES permit. Under the CWA,
permits are issued “after an opportunity for a public hearing” and further
states that “permit applications” and the actual permits must be available to
the public.204 The CWA also provides for requirements regarding public
notice and public comment, but such hearings are only held if there is a
“significant degree of public interest.”205 Thus, an unambiguous definition of
“agriculture stormwater discharge” may broaden the breadth of CAFOs
required to apply for an NPDES permit, which in turn would require them to
go through the permit application process. The agriculture industry might
oppose such a set definition because this would potentially expose more
CAFOs to EPA regulations via the NPDES permit program and thus burden
202

Id.; see EPA, 2003 Response to Comments (EPA–HQ–OW–2002–0025–0060), at 1–661
(Excerpt CAFONODA–600031–1) (May 25, 2005).
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Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 704.
204
Gaba, supra note 49, at 417-18; see Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1342(a)(1),
1342(j) (2014).
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Gaba, supra note 49, at 418 (citing Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation, 445 U.S. 198,
216 (1980), in which the Court rejected the argument the CWA mandated a public
hearing for every NPDES permit application); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 124.1-.21, 124.51.66 (citing the EPA regulations governing permit procedures).
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and/or temporarily halt agricultural operations. However, CAFOs required to
apply for an NPDES permit would only face a small inconvenience of going
through the process; the time it takes to get a permit depends on the type of
discharge, but typically the review and approval of an application does not
take more than a couple of weeks.206 Additionally, as established in Costle v.
Pacific Legal Foundation,207 public hearings regarding the permits are only
required when there is a “significant degree of public interest,” which would
exclude a majority of CAFOs. Thus, the benefit of improving the nation’s
water quality significantly outweighs the small cost CAFOs may face in a set
definition of “agricultural stormwater discharge,” which is the slight
inconvenience of applying for a permit.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Alt Court’s decision has further invigorated the notion that
“agricultural stormwater discharges” are exempt from all point source
regulations, including CAFOs. Despite the huge amount of pollution
stemming from the agricultural industry—especially CAFOs—the
agricultural stormwater discharge exemption continues to act as a shield
against liability for inadvertent and uncontrollable discharges of pollutants
that are weather-related. The Alt Court wisely followed other jurisdictions in
defining “agricultural stormwater discharge” based upon its plain and
ordinary meaning, which in turn maintained consistency in how the
exemption is to be applied. However, there is an increasing need for the EPA
to promulgate a regulation that unambiguously defines the scope of
“agricultural stormwater discharge,” as well as mandates BMPs in order to
reduce the amount of discharge originating from CAFOs outside a
confinement area, manure storage area, and similar features deemed to be the
CAFO production area. In doing so, the EPA would be taking an affirmative
step in keeping within the spirit of the CWA by reducing the impact CAFOs
have on the nation’s water while also giving guidance to, as well as imposing
liability on, CAFO operators only to the degree that they can implement
BMPs to control the amount of manure and litter outside the production area.
206
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